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**“Free trade” is spread though the imperialism and the threat of force – it is an ideological justification for removing barriers to exploitation**

**Tabb 7** (William, Dep. of Econ @ Queens College, Monthly Review Vol. 58.10 March JF)

What drives capitalism is not some imaginary free market with its consumer sovereign but rather capital’s drive to accumulate. Imperialists seeking to exploit peoples and resources wherever they find vulnerable social formations make their calculation exclusive of the cost to their own nation’s treasury, except to the extent they themselves bear any burden of expenditure. The saturation of domestic markets and the drives to lower cost, find new sources of profit, and employ technological revolutions for accumulation purposes combine to drive capitalism outward. Trade was rarely initiated, as the economists’ model would have it, out of free consent for mutual advantage between core and periphery. In the early stages of imperialism—of plunder and piracy—this was self-evident and overseas expansion required a very different rationale. From a marxist view successful capitalism needs the national state to overcome internal barriers to the creation and smooth operation of its home market and to protect its traders’ and investors’ interests abroad in a world of rival states. So if the drive to expand and to encompass the world market is given in the nature of capitalism as Marx suggested, then imperialism is not an accident but integral to its operation and logic. The drive to compete does not presume, as the mainstream economists would have it, an ideal of perfect competition as the tendential norm and starting point of analysis, but the use of state power on the part of the strongest elements to intervene on behalf of their power to exploit and extort rules favorable to the greatest appropriation of surplus. As innovations in transportation and communication develop so does the capacity to more deeply penetrate other social formations. Those who take imperialism seriously think that the models mainstream economists construct underspecify and misspecify the way trade and growth are connected and incorporate assumptions (such as full employment of all resources in a competitive marketplace) that do not model actual capitalism’s character. As Patrick O’Brien writes “In order to measure the costs and benefits that might have arisen from a disembodied imperialism they have resorted to an analysis based upon an altogether unrealistic counterfactual; namely, an international economic order, operating between 1688 and 1815 under competitive conditions, virtually free from governmental interference with trade and untroubled by warfare.”8 Such counterfactual economic theory that presents “free trade” as the dominant reality even in the colonial era itself has then been used to argue that the burdens of colonies and the imperial military apparatus outweigh their benefits since free trade is more efficient and more beneficial to both parties. Counterfactual history is a difficult, if not in most instances an impossible, business. But it is not without interest that in 1820, according to Angus Maddison’s calculations, Asia generated 59 percent of global GDP (by purchasing power parity measure); in 1950 just 18 percent of world GDP.13 It is difficult to think that foreign intervention and conquest had nothing to do with this huge relative decline. When a post-Maoist government sought an opening to the West on its own terms, these disgraces were a vivid memory. Thus they desired a carefully calibrated economic policy that would allow them to control this process. Developmental states have found industrial policy can be used effectively as in Japan and Korea. The activities of the IMF and the WTO as directed by the countries of the core can be read as acting to prevent the possibility of state-led development, once practiced by the now developed economies. There continues to be a need for active interventionist policies to establish and maintain what has been called “free trade,” and military intervention and the threat of use of overwhelming force remain central tools of the imperialist project. Imperialism is a capacious category and its usage has stretched from control and rivalry over foreign markets to the face of conquest and regime change. The role of corporate and financial interests in removing obstacles to trade and investment is of course hardly absent in the current imperialist adventure in Iraq. An administration deeply entangled in oil and defense contracting has thus lied its way into what is proving a painful quagmire. The application of the Bush Doctrine has pushed to the background the framework which has guided the polices of his father’s administration and the Clinton White House—the expansion of U.S. power through the creation and modification of trade and investment relations on a global terrain. We are reminded by today’s events that imperialism is above all about defending and expanding global control. This involves two tactical avenues: military force and political governance. The two go together although not always in overt ways. Twenty-first-century imperialism is about neoliberal globalization. The regimes for trade, finance, and investment of the global economic governance institutions—the IMF, the WTO, and others—are nonetheless supplemented when imperialism believes it necessary by the old standby of military conquest and horrific violence. Washington’s arrogance of invasion and regime change, of naked imperialist ambition, is in our time a failure—in all but its ability to inflict horrendous cost on its victims. It has given rise to a vibrant antiwar movement and the dissatisfaction of tens of millions of Americans who have recently become more aware of the arrogance of imperialist power.

**Competitiveness decides who lives and who dies based on capitalist market performance**

Bristow, Cardiff University School of City and Regional Planning, 5

(Gillian, 4/13/2005, “Everyone’s a ‘winner’: problematizing the discourse of regional competitiveness,” Journal of Economic Competitiveness 5, p. 286-287, bs)

Competitiveness is usually used to refer to firm performance. The discourse of firm competitiveness comes from two principal sources. The first of these is the discourse of the economics profession, where competitiveness is regarded as a somewhat abstract quality conferred upon successful firms by the markets within which they operate. Thus, ‘the market is the impartial and ultimate arbiter of right behaviour in the economy and competitiveness simply describes the result of responding correctly to market signals’ (Schoenberger, 1998, 3). The fusion of economics with evolutionary theory has imbued the concept with the notion of ‘survival of the fittest’. Firms, like organisms, are seen as living on the edge, with survivors being those who are able to survive or ‘win’ in a dynamic world of economic competition (Sheppard, 2000). Competitiveness has thus become inescapably associated with ideas of fitness and unfitness, and these in turn with the implied premise of merit, as in ‘deserving to live’ and ‘deserving to die’. Secondly, competitiveness is also the discourse of the business community where it represents the fundamental external validation of a firm’s ability to survive, compete and grow in markets subject to international competition. This provides a pervasive and powerful means of explaining almost any behaviour i.e. a firm ‘must doX in order to be competitive’ (Schoenberger, 1998).

#### Capitalism causes extinction and destroys value to life

Simonovic 7 [Ljubodrag, Ph.D. in Philosophy; M.A. in Law; author of seven books, 2007, A New World is Possible, “Basis of contemporary critical theory of capitalism.”] Gender edited

The final stage of a mortal combat between [hu]mankind and capitalism is in progress. A specificity of capitalism is that, in contrast to "classical" barbarism (which is of destructive, murderous and plundering nature), it annihilates life by creating a "new world" – a "technical civilization" and an adequate, dehumanized and denaturalized man. Capitalism has eradicated man from his (natural) environment and has cut off the roots through which he had drawn life-creating force. Cities are "gardens" of capitalism where degenerated creatures "grow". Dog excrement, gasoline and sewerage stench, glaring advertisements and police car rotating lights that howl through the night - this is the environment of the "free world" man. By destroying the natural environment capitalism creates increasingly extreme climatic conditions in which ~~man is~~ [people are] struggling harder and harder to survive – and creates artificial living conditions accessible solely to the richest layer of population, which cause definitive degeneration of ~~man~~ [people] as a natural being[s]. "Humanization of life" is being limited to creation of micro-climatic conditions, of special capitalistic incubators - completely commercialized artificial living conditions to which degenerated people are appropriate. The most dramatic truth is: capitalism can survive the death of man as a human and biological being. For capitalism a "traditional ~~man~~ [person]" is merely a temporary means of its own reproduction. "Consumer~~-man~~ [person]" represents a transitional phase in the capitalism-caused process of mutation of man towards the "highest" form of capitalistic ~~man:~~ a robot~~-man.~~ "Terminators" and other robotized freaks which are products of the Hollywood entertainment industry which creates a "vision of the future" degenerated in a capitalist manner, incarnate creative powers, alienated from man, which become vehicles for destruction of man and life. A new "super race" of robotized humanoids is being created, which should clash with "traditional mankind", meaning with people capable of loving, thinking, daydreaming, fighting for freedom and survival - and impose their rule over the Earth. Instead of the new world, the "new man" is being created - who has been reduced to a level of humanity which cannot jeopardize the ruling order. Science and technique have become the basic lever of capital for the destruction of the world and the creation of "technical civilization". It is not only about destruction achieved by the use of technical means. It is about technicization of social institutions, of interpersonal relations, of the human body. Increasing transformation of nature into a surrogate of "nature", increasing dehumanization of the society and increasing denaturalization of man are direct consequences of capital's effort, within an increasingly merciless global economic war, to achieve complete commercialization of both natural and the social environment. The optimism of the Enlightenment could hardly be unreservedly supported nowadays, the notion of Marx that man imposes on himself only such tasks as he can solve, particularly the optimism based on the myth of the "omnipotence" of science and technique. The race for profits has already caused irreparable and still unpredictable damage to both man and his environment. By the creation of "consumer society", which means through the transition of capitalism into a phase of pure destruction, such a qualitative rise in destruction of nature and [hu]mankind has been performed that life on the planet is literally facing a "countdown". Instead of the "withering away" (Engels) of institutions of the capitalist society, the withering away of life is taking place.

**Cap leads to Structural violence- that outweighs everything**

**Abu-jamal 98-**[Mumia, award winning Pennsylvania journalist, quotes James Gilligan, Professor at Harvard/NYU, “A quiet and deadly violence”, <http://www.flashpoints.net/mQuietDeadlyViolence.html>]

The deadliest form of violence is poverty. --GhandiIt has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation. Every year, some 20,000 people are killed by others, and additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence. But, as remarkable, and harrowing as this level and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent features of living in the midst of the American empire. We live, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, in a nation that condones and ignores wide-ranging"structural' violence, of a kind thatdestroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; By "structural violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function ofthe class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes: [E]very fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear warthat caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocideof the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on theweak andpoor every year of every decade, throughout the world. [Gilligan, p. 196] Worse still, in a thoroughly capitalist society, much of that violence became internalized, turned back on the Self, because, in a society based on the priority of wealth, those who own nothing are taught to loathe themselves, as if something is inherently wrong with themselves, instead of the social order that promotes this self-loathing. This intense self-hatred was often manifested in familial violence as when the husband beats the wife, the wife smacks the son, and the kids fight each other. This vicious, circular, and invisible violence, unacknowledged by the corporate media, uncriticized in substandard educational systems, and un-understood by the very folks who suffer in its grips, feeds on the spectacular and more common forms of violence that the system makes damn sure -that we can recognize and must react to it. This fatal and systematic violence may be called The War on the Poor. It is found in every country, submerged beneath the sands of history, buried, yet ever present, as omnipotent as death. In the struggles over the commons in Europe, when the peasants struggled and lost their battles for their commonal lands (a precursor to similar struggles throughout Africa and the Americas), this violence was sanctified, by church and crown, as the 'Divine Right of Kings' to the spoils of class battle. Scholars Frances Fox-Piven and Richard A Cloward wrote, in The New Class War (Pantheon, 1982/1985): They did not lose because landowners were immune to burning and preaching and rioting. They lost because the usurpations of owners were regularly defended by the legal authority and the armed force of the state. It was the state that imposed increased taxes or enforced the payment of increased rents, and evicted or jailed those who could not pay the resulting debts. It was the state that made lawful the appropriation by landowners of the forests, streams, and commons, and imposed terrifying penalties on those who persisted in claiming the old rights to these resources. It was the state that freed serfs or emancipated sharecroppers only to leave them landless. (52) The "Law", then, was a tool of the powerful to protect their interests, then, as now. It was a weapon against the poor and impoverished, then, as now. It punished retail violence, while turning a blind eye to the wholesale violence daily done by their class masters. The law was, and is, a tool of state power, utilized to protect the status quo, no matter how oppressive that status was, or is. Systems are essentially ways of doing things that have concretized into tradition, and custom, without regard to the rightness of those ways. No system that causes this kind of harm to people should be allowed to remain, based solely upon its time in existence. Systems must serve life, or be discarded as a threat and a danger to life. Such systems must pass away, so that theirgreat and terribleviolence passes away with them.

Our alternative is to vote negative to reject the affirmative as a refusal to participate in activities which support capitalism. We must hollow out capitalist structures by refusing to invest our energy in reforms and rescue operations—avoids transition wars

Herod 4-Social Activist since 1968, owns an awesome website, Attended Columbia University and spent a year abroad at the University of Beirut (Lebanon) [James, Getting Free, 2004, http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm]

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and *start participating* in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing everything we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we’re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There *is* no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can’t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It’s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must *want something else* and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction.

## Econ

**Economic growth doesn’t solve war**

**Ferguson 06**-Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History @ Harvard University, William Ziegler Professor of Bussiness Administration @ Harvard Bussiness School, Phillipe Roman Chair in History and International Affairs @ the London School of Economics, Research Fellow @ the University of Cambrige, Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Instituion, Stanford University, Senior Research Fellow @ Jesus College, Oxford University, PhD, MA, B.A. in History @ Oxford University [Niall, Foreign Affairs, “The Next War of the World,” September/October 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61916/niall-ferguson/the-next-war-of-the-world>]

It might have been expected that such prosperity would eliminate the causes of war. But much of the worst violence of the twentieth century involved the relatively wealthy countries at the opposite ends of Eurasia. The chief lesson of the twentieth century is that countries can provide their citizens with wealth, longevity, literacy, and even democracy but still descend into lethal conflict. Leon Trotsky nicely summed up the paradox when reflecting on the First Balkan War of 1912-13, which he covered as a reporter. The conflict, Trotsky wrote, "shows that we still haven't crawled out on all fours from the barbaric stage of our history. We have learned to wear suspenders, to write clever editorials, and to make chocolate milk, but when we have to decide seriously a question of the coexistence of a few tribes on a rich peninsula of Europe, we are helpless to find a way other than mutual mass slaughter." Trotsky later made his own contribution to the history of mass slaughter as the people's commissar for war and as the commander of the Red Army during the Russian Civil War.

No impact to economic collapse – empirics

Gordon 08 - historian specializing in business and financial history, full-time writer for the last nineteen years, Gordon's articles have been published in, among others, Forbes, Forbes FYI, Worth, The New York Times Book Review, The New York Times's and The Wall Street Journal's Op-Ed pages, and The Washington Post's Book World and Outlook Panics and Politics [John, 10/22/08, Journal of the American enterprise institute, Panics and Politics <http://www.american.com/archive/2008/october-10-08/panics-and-politics>]

Will the current financial crisis spur a major political realignment? If history is any guide, the answer is probably no. America has experienced recurrent financial meltdowns since its birth in the late 18th century. Indeed, there were severe credit crunches and Wall Street collapses in 1792, 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, 1907, 1929, 1987, and now 2008. Most of these panics have not been followed by seismic political shifts. To be sure, President Martin Van Buren, who took office a month before the stock market crash of 1837, lost badly when he ran for reelection in the depression year of 1840. But Van Buren was an unpopular and ineffective president, and his defeat did not signal a realignment.

**Economic collapse does not cause war
Ferguson 06**-Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History @ Harvard University, William Ziegler Professor of Bussiness Administration @ Harvard Bussiness School, Phillipe Roman Chair in History and International Affairs @ the London School of Economics, Research Fellow @ the University of Cambrige, Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Instituion, Stanford University, Senior Research Fellow @ Jesus College, Oxford University, PhD, MA, B.A. in History @ Oxford University [Niall, Foreign Affairs, “The Next War of the World,” September/October 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61916/niall-ferguson/the-next-war-of-the-world>]

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

**Decline doesn’t cause catastrophic collapse – no transition wars**

**Zakaria 09**-PhD in Political Science @ Harvard University, PhD in Philosophy @ Harvard University, Editor of Newsweek, host of CNN show Fareed Zakaria GPS, B.A @ Yale, President of the Yale Political Monthly, Board Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Yale University, the Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company, named

 "One of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" [Fareed, “The Secrets of Stability,” December 12, 2009, <http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/articles.html>]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: “The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump ‘cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.’ This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression.” Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that “the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year.” Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn’t add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. “The question I have at the back of my head is ‘Is that it?’ ” says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. “We had this huge crisis, and now we’re back to business as usual?” This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It’s true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there’s a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. **The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think**. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature. The first is the spread of great-power peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world’s major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms. There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations. This lack of conflict is extremely rare in history. You would have to go back at least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. The number of people who have died as a result of wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism over the last 30 years has declined sharply (despite what you might think on the basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonder—three decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That clash of superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. Nothing like that is happening today. Peace is like oxygen, Harvard’s Joseph Nye has written. When you don’t have it, it’s all you can think about, but when you do, you don’t appreciate your good fortune. Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade. The peace that flowed from the end of the Cold War had a much larger effect because it was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism. The world was left with a sole superpower but also a single workable economic model—capitalism—albeit with many variants from Sweden to Hong Kong. This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which almost all countries across the globe were participants. That means everyone is invested in the same system. Today, while the nations of Eastern Europe might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism and return to communism. In fact, around the world you see the opposite: even in the midst of this downturn, there have been few successful electoral appeals for a turn to socialism or a rejection of the current framework of political economy. Center-right parties have instead prospered in recent elections throughout the West.

**Economic decline doesn’t cause war- prefer consensus**

**Jaroslav 10—**Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia [Tir , The Journal of Politics, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425, Hopkins]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.[14](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#fn14) The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job ([1986](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref68)), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham ([1998a](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref22), [1998b](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref23)), DeRouen ([1995](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref17)), and Gowa ([1998](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref34)) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis ([1997](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref50)) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani ([2005](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref69)) and Russett and Oneal ([2001](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref73)) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides ([1995](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref38)), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s ([2002](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref24)) revision of Gowa’s ([1998](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref34)) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake ([2002](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref19)) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett ([1997](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref66)) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett ([1990](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref72))—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering ([2007](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref49)) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski ([2008](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref84)) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.[15](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#fn15) Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems

**No risk of Asian war**

**Bitzinger 09**-Richard A., Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Barry Desker, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2009. Survival vol. 50 no. 6, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” p. Proquest

Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.

**Dedev is key to democracy**

**Chomsky 88** [Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor of Linguistics at MIT. 1988, Language and Politics, p. 162]

Personally I’m in favor of democracywhich means thatthecentral institutions inthesociety have to be under popular control**.** Now**,** under capitalism we can’t have democracy by definition**.** Capitalism is a system in whichthe central institutions of society are in principle under autocratic control. Thus, a corporation oran industry is**,** if we were to think of it in political terms**,** fascist; that is, it has tight control at the top and strict obedience has to be established at every level—there’s little bargaining, a little give and take, but the line of authority isperfectlystraightforward. Just as I’m opposed to political fascism, I’m opposed to economic fascism. I think that until major institutions of society are underthepopular control of participants and communities, it’s pointless to talk about democracy. In this sense, I would describe myself as a libertarian socialist**—** I’d love to see centralized power eliminated, whether it’s the state or the economy, and have it diffused andultimately under direct control of the participants**.** Moreover,I think that’s entirely realistic. Every bit of evidence that exists(there isn’t much)seems to show**,** for example**,** that workers’ control increases efficiency. Nevertheless, capitalists don’t want it, naturally; what they’re worried about is control, not the loss of productivity or efficiency.

**Collapse now is key to prevent extinction**

**Barry 8** – President and Founder of Ecological Internet, Ph.D. in Land Resources from U-Wisconsin-Madison (Glen, “Economic Collapse And Global Ecology”, http://www.countercurrents.org/barry140108.htm)

Humanity and the Earth are faced with an enormous conundrum -- sufficient climate policies enjoy political support only in times of rapid economic growth. Yet this growth is the primary factor driving greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental ills. The growth machine has pushed the planet well beyond its ecological carrying capacity, and unless constrained, can only lead to human extinction and an end to complex life. With every economic downturn, like the one now looming in the United States, it becomes more difficult and less likely that policy sufficient to ensure global ecological sustainability will be embraced. This essay explores the possibility that from a biocentric viewpoint of needs for long-term global ecological, economic and social sustainability; it would be better for the economic collapse to come now rather than later. Economic growth is a deadly disease upon the Earth, with capitalism as its most virulent strain. Throw-away consumption and explosive population growth are made possible by using up fossil fuels and destroying ecosystems. Holiday shopping numbers are covered by media in the same breath as Arctic ice melt, ignoring their deep connection. Exponential economic growth destroys ecosystems and pushes the biosphere closer to failure. Humanity has proven itself unwilling and unable to address climate change and other environmental threats with necessary haste and ambition. Action on coal, forests, population, renewable energy and emission reductions could be taken now at net benefit to the economy. Yet, the losers -- primarily fossil fuel industries and their bought oligarchy -- successfully resist futures not dependent upon their deadly products. Perpetual economic growth, and necessary climate and other ecological policies, are fundamentally incompatible. Global ecological sustainability depends critically upon establishing a steady state economy, whereby production is right-sized to not diminish natural capital. Whole industries like coal and natural forest logging will be eliminated even as new opportunities emerge in solar energy and environmental restoration. This critical transition to both economic and ecological sustainability is simply not happening on any scale. The challenge is how to carry out necessary environmental policies even as economic growth ends and consumption plunges. The natural response is going to be liquidation of even more life-giving ecosystems, and jettisoning of climate policies, to vainly try to maintain high growth and personal consumption. We know that humanity must reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% over coming decades. How will this and other necessary climate mitigation strategies be maintained during years of economic downturns, resource wars, reasonable demands for equitable consumption, and frankly, the weather being more pleasant in some places? If efforts to reduce emissions and move to a steady state economy fail; the collapse of ecological, economic and social systems is assured. Bright greens take the continued existence of a habitable Earth with viable, sustainable populations of all species including humans as the ultimate truth and the meaning of life. Whether this is possible in a time of economic collapse is crucially dependent upon whether enough ecosystems and resources remain post collapse to allow humanity to recover and reconstitute sustainable, relocalized societies. It may be better for the Earth and humanity's future that economic collapse comes sooner rather than later, while more ecosystems and opportunities to return to nature's fold exist. Economic collapse will be deeply wrenching -- part Great Depression, part African famine. There will be starvation and civil strife, and a long period of suffering and turmoil. Many will be killed as balance returns to the Earth. Most people have forgotten how to grow food and that their identity is more than what they own. Yet there is some justice, in that those who have lived most lightly upon the land will have an easier time of it, even as those super-consumers living in massive cities finally learn where their food comes from and that ecology is the meaning of life. Economic collapse now means humanity and the Earth ultimately survive to prosper again. Human suffering -- already the norm for many, but hitting the currently materially affluent -- is inevitable given the degree to which the planet's carrying capacity has been exceeded. We are a couple decades at most away from societal strife of a much greater magnitude as the Earth's biosphere fails. Humanity can take the bitter medicine now, and recover while emerging better for it; or our total collapse can be a final, fatal death swoon. A successful revolutionary response to imminent global ecosystem collapse would focus upon bringing down the Earth's industrial economy now. As society continues to fail miserably to implement necessary changes to allow creation to continue, maybe the best strategy to achieve global ecological sustainability is economic sabotage to hasten the day. It is more fragile than it looks.

## China

**No China threat - domestic issues will keep them out of military confrontation with the US**

**MacDonald, 11** – US Institute of Peace (5/11/2011, Bruee W., Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs, pdf)

In the face of this growing Chinese military space challenge, it is easy to assume the worst about Chinese intentions. China seeks to be able to prevail militarily at some point in the future should conflict come, but they see the United States as militarily superior to them and thus would be unlikely to consciously provoke any military conflict. While we should guard against a worst case, we should not treat it as a given. I do not believe China or the PLA is spoiling for a fight with the United States – China has come too far to want to place their substantial economic achievements at risk unless they faced an extraordinary threat to their national security. In addition, China faces serious demographic realities over the next couple of decades, where their ratio of workers to retirees will shrink substantially (the result of their one- child policy), which further underscores China’s need for stability and continued economic growth for years to come. China also has additional needs, and vulnerabilities: • Growing environmental problems and water shortages with no obvious solutions that are growing irritants to the public; • A relentless search for new sources of manufacturing inputs; • An increasingly restive working class that is making new demands for higher wages and political freedoms; • A non-democratic one-party system that leaves its senior leadership constantly looking over its shoulder at possible challenges to its authority, especially in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring”; • Growing citizen anger against corruption and cronyism that seems impossible for the CCP to root out; and many more. These factors are reasons why China is probably not looking for war with the United States, though they also could inadvertently become factors in China’s stumbling into a conflict they would ordinarily not want, through miscalculation or distraction.

**China is solely reactionary – US action would spark dangerous counterbalancing**

**Zhang, 11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University (March/April, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 2, JSTOR)

Although many U.S. experts are correct in emphasizing the importance of space war in China’s asymmetric strategy to counter U.S. conventional advantages, this article suggests that China’s military space agenda is also driven by the security dilemma between the two countries. China is pursuing military capabilities in space to counter perceived national security threats posed by the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense that could neutralize China’s nuclear deterrence. In both cases, Chinese security experts believe that the U.S. seeks “absolute security” in order to maximize protection for the American population from external threats.9 This means that China at least recognizes the defensive motivations behind the U.S. quest for space dominance and missile defense. However, with the chaotic nature of international relations, one country’s efforts to maximize its security could degrade the security of others by changing the balance of power. Inevitably, the U.S. quest for “absolute security” evokes countermeasures from other countries. As Kenneth Waltz observes, when a great power seeks superiority, others will respond in kind, since “maintaining status quo is the minimum goal of any great power.”